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Paternalism, Hostility, and Concern for the Slippery Slope: Factors
in Judicial Decision-Making When Religion and Regulation Collide
Supryia M. Ray
1I. INTRODUCTION
Religion{and the demands religious doctrine imposes on the believer{
has presented some of the most vexing issues of the last three decades. Various
government agencies have brought their power to bear upon individuals assert-
ing a Free Exercise right to undertake some practice that appears to conict
with prevailing law. When such conicts occur, whether the agency institutes a
criminal prosecution or is hauled into court by the claimant for denying a reli-
gious exemption, thorny constitutional issues inevitably arise. Courts must not
only determine whether a claimant is bona de{whether the claimant is sincere
and truly making a religious claim{but they must also confront a host of claims
posing direct conict with various laws and regulations.
This paper will examine religious claims as they pertain to food and
drug law issues, as exemplied by litigation surrounding 1) the Church of Sci-
entology's use of an instrument known as the Hubbard Electrometer, and 2)
sacramental drug use. Individuals and groups alike have vigorously pursued and
defended cases on both the state and federal level under the rubric of religious
freedom when government action has impacted directly on asserted religious
practices. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
acted to end all use of an instrument known as the Hubbard Electrometer, used
by practitioners of Dianetics and by adherents of the Church of Scientology,
by instituting condemnation actions under the medical device provisions of the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938;1 the agency also sought to prevent the
importation of such devices into the United States. Throughout the past three
decades, various agencies charged with administering and enforcing drug laws
(such as the Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA] and the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs [BNDD]) have prosecuted individuals for violating drug laws,
and those who claim that their involvement with a given drug is religiously
motivated or mandated have often fought back, most commonly by alleging a
violation of Free Exercise, though they have made numerous other claims as
well. Examples include Timothy Leary, Robert Boyll, a member of the Native
American Church, and Judith Kuch, aliated with the Neo-American Church.
Numerous individuals (associated with groups such as the Native American
Church, Native American Church of New York, Peyote Way Church of God,
the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, and the Church of the Awakening) have also
petitioned agencies such as the DEA for a religious exemption from drug laws,
claiming sacramental drug use. Denial of such petitions has often resulted in
litigation.
After providing an overview of a number of religious claims, agency
actions, and the litigation that ensued, I will identify three motivating factors
that recur in and aect judicial decision-making, as well as evaluate their impact
on the outcome of various cases. I will argue that court decisions with respect to
government action against Scientology and sacramental drug use are motivated
primarily by one or more of the following factors: paternalism; hostility; and/or
121 U.S.C. 351-60.
2fear of embarking upon a slippery slope.
II. OVERVIEW
In this section, I will discuss several cases decided during a period
ranging roughly from the mid-1960s, when many drugs were criminalized on
the federal level for the rst time and when Scientology became a target of sev-
eral government agencies, until the late 1980s, when the Supreme Court handed
down a decision radically altering the tradition of Free Exercise jurisprudence
established a quarter of a century earlier.
Let me begin, however, by explaining what type of case I will not ad-
dress in this paper: cases in which a governmental ordinance, law, or regulation
specically targets a particular group because of its professed religious beliefs.
Such overt examples of hostility and discrimination are rare, and in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court reiterated
one of the few things that has long been clear in Free Exercise jurisprudence:
non-neutral or non-generally applicable laws that burden religious practice are
subject to the compelling interest test and will rarely withstand the rigorous
scrutiny this test entails.2 The Lukumi case involved an eort by the City of
Hialeah to suppress ritual, religious animal sacrice, the central element of the
Santeria worship service;3 in 1987, the City passed a number of ordinances that,
taken together, criminalized animal sacrice,4 a practice that played a key role
in a number of Santeria ceremonies; after such a ceremony, the animal would be
cooked and eaten.5 Finding that the ordinances were neither neutral nor gener-
ally applicable{rather, they were gerrymandered with care to prescribe religious
killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings and grossly under-
inclusive, essentially burdening only Santeria religious practice and replete with
exceptions for kosher slaughter, hunting, killing pests, and so forth{the court
struck down the governmental action under the compelling interest test.6
Most cases are not as easy to decide as Lukumi, for they burden an
asserted religious practice via the application of a facially neutral, generally
applicable criminal law or regulation. Until the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith
(1989),7 it was settled Free Exercise jurisprudence that the government must
2508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). The compelling interest test
requires that a law must be justied by a compelling
government interest; furthermore, the law must be nar-
rowly tailored to advance that interest in order to pass
constitutional muster. Id. at 531.
3Id. at 534.
4Id. at 526-28.
5Id. at 524, 525.
6Id. at 542-46.
7494 U.S. 872 (1989).
3justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling
state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.8 The
compelling interest test was, in essence, a balancing test weighted toward the
religious claimant; unless the government could demonstrate that the claimant
was not making a bona de religious claim or that accommodating that claim
would signicantly interfere with a compelling government interest, courts were,
in theory, supposed to grant a religious exemption. Smith held that this com-
pelling interest test, as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner (1963)9 and Wisconsin
v. Yoder (1972),10 was not applicable to criminal laws that are both neutral
and generally applicable;11 in other words, the court held that, no matter how
signicant the burden on religious motivated conduct, the operation of neutral,
generally applicable laws does not implicate Free Exercise concerns. As such, it
radically altered Free Exercise jurisprudence.
I provide this summary of Free Exercise jurisprudence primarily to
clarify a point of potential confusion: during the period with which I am pri-
marily concerned{the mid-1960s to the late-1980s{courts faced with a neutral,
generally applicable law that burdened religious practice were supposed to apply
the compelling interest test, provided that a claimant was bona de; of course,
not all courts did use this standard in practice. Smith changed this rule, but
Smith was itself legislatively overruled by Congress when it passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993, restoring the compelling interest test
as set forth in Sherbert and Yoder.12 A challenge to RFRA is now before the
Supreme Court. A discussion of the impact of Smith and RFRA is beyond the
scope of this paper, which focuses on cases decided during the period of time
between Sherbert and Smith.13
A. Scientology
A variety of government entities have come into conict with the
Church of Scientology. The Church has litigated issues involving its tax sta-
tus,14 its solicitation practices, and its use of the Hubbard Electrometer (or
E-meter, as it is more popularly called); various Church ocials have even been
8Id. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9374 U.S. 398 (1963).
10406 U.S. 205 (1972)
11Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
12Sec. 2(b), Pub. L. No. 103-141 (1993).
13An expansion of this paper might entail a discussion
of howSmith aected judicial decision-making regarding
cases similar to those discussed in this paper and an ex-
ploration of RFRA's impact on the conict between re-
ligious claims and regulation of food and drugs.
14See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. United
States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct.Cl. 1969). Individuals have
4the target of criminal prosecutions. I will focus on the government's eorts
to ban or otherwise restrict the use of the E-meter in the United States. The
FDA has used the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) to pursue two
distinct lines of attack against the E-meter. First, the FDA instituted an action
to condemn the E-meter, alleging that it was a medical device, misbranded in
violation of the Act. The FDA contended that the E-meter lacked adequate
directions for use and that its labeling made false and misleading claims for the
treatment of disease regarding auditing, the process in which the instrument
was used.15
The FDA contended that the E-meter qualied as a device,16 thereby
bringing it within the scope of FDA regulation, a contention accepted by every
court that has addressed the issue.17
The E-meter is used by Scientologists in a process called auditing, and it is
generally considered essential to that process.18 It is a rather crude skin gal-
vanometer, constructed of two tin soup cans hooked up to an electrical appa-
ratus. An auditor asks the subject questions as he or she holds the cans, and
the E-meter measures changes in the electrical resistance of that subject's skin.
Auditors then use the rules and procedures set out in Scientology publications...
[to] interpret the movements of the needle after certain prescribed questions are
also brought cases against the IRS for disallowing de-
ductions taken as charitable contributions for payments
made to the Church for auditing and training courses.
15Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409
F.2d 1146, 1161 (D.D.C. 1969).
16The Act denes device as
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine...,
which is{....
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of dis-
ease or other condition, or in the cure, mitigation, treat-
ment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals...
and which does not achieve its primary intended
purposes through chemical action within or upon the
body of man or other animals and which is not depen-
dent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its
primary intended purposes.
21 U.S.C. 321(h).
17United States of America v. An Article or Device...
Hubbard Electrometer, 333 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D.D.C.
1971) [hereinafterHubbard Electrometer].
18See, e.g.,Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d at
1153.
5asked, and... diagnos[es] the mental and spiritual condition of the subject.19
Generally, courts have recognized that the device is, in and of itself, harmless.20
Auditing, although represented primarily as a method of improving
the spiritual condition of man, also promises rather explicit benets to bodily
health.21 Auditing was rst discussed in L. Ron Hubbard's best-selling book,
Dianetics, in which he asserts that engrams, patterns imprinted upon the ner-
vous system in moments of pain, stress or unconsciousness,22 cause and per-
petuate a variety of mental and psychosomatic disorders.23 Hubbard claimed
that numerous ills, including arthritis, asthma, ulcers, and even cancer could be
treated{and cured{via auditing.24 Such health claims{and the use of auditing
as an aid{however, are scattered throughout a number of books and pamphlets,
and none were made on the labeling of the device itself; in fact, the device
sported no labeling at all when the FDA brought its condemnation action.
The FDA argued that this literature, which was sold in the Distribu-
tion Center, a bookstore in the Church's basement that adjoined the Hubbard
Guidance Center in which auditing was conducted and E-meters used, accom-
panied the E-meter and thus qualied as labeling for the device.25 It further
19Id.
20See, e.g.,Hubbard Electrometer,333 F. Supp. at 363.
21Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d at 1152.
22Id.
23L. RON HUBBARD, DIANETICS: THE MODERN
SCIENCE OF MENTAL HEALTH 91-108 (1950).
24Id. at 92-93; the cancer claim appears in a later work,
L. RON HUBBARD, SCIENTOLOGY: A HISTORY OF
MAN 21 (4th ed. 1961). Scientology has existed both as
a secular and religious movement. As a secular practice,
it encompasses Dianetics, which is viewed as the branch
particularly pertinent to mental health; as a religious
practice, it accepts and incorporates all of Hubbard's
teachings{his views, his writings, and his instructions{
as authoritative. See, e.g., Founding Church of Scien-
tology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1202 (Ct.Cl.
1969). Scientology as a secular practice co-existed with
Scientology as a religious practice until Judge Gesell es-
sentially outlawed secular use of the E-meter inHubbard
Electrometer.
25Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d at 1152,
1149. Labeling is dened in 21 U.S.C. 321(m) as follows:
The term 'labeling' means all labels and other written,
printed, or graphic material matter (1) upon any article
6alleged that the literature was false and misleading due to the health claims it
contained. The Church admitted that the E-meter had no use in the diagnosis
or treatment of disease as such but defended on the ground that its use of the
device was protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.26 It
asserted that its use of the E-meter was religious in nature, designed to treat the
human spirit; it also asserted a belief that the body can be aected via healing
of the spirit.27 After a jury trial, in which the district court allowed the jury
to consider several pieces of Distribution Center literature, it condemned and
ordered the destruction of E-meters and literature owned by the Church as well
as individual adherents.28
On appeal, the court, in a seminal opinion written by Judge Skelly
Wright, found that at least some of the literature was improperly admitted be-
cause it qualied as religious doctrine. The court relied on United States v.
Ballard29 to establish the point that the First Amendment bars courts from
assessing the truth or falsity of religious belief.30 It then argued that if [the
Church's] claims to religious status are accepted, a nding that the seized lit-
erature misrepresents the benets from auditing is a nding that their religious
doctrines are false. To construe the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to permit
such a nding would, in the light of Ballard, present the gravest constitutional
diculties.31 Having determined that the Church made out an unrebutted
prima facie case for its status as a religion,32 the court specically found that
Literature setting forth the theory of auditing, including the claims for curative
ecacy contained therein, is religious doctrine of Scientology and hence as a
matter of law is not 'labeling got the purposes of the Act.33 Since the govern-
ment had relied on much of this literature to establish misbranding, and since
the court found that the literature was not 'labeling' within the meaning of the
statute as interpreted in the light of the First Amendment (emphasis mine),34
it reversed the district court.
Wright's opinion left open several avenues of attack, however{avenues
that the FDA would use in its next action against the E-meter. Having empha-
sized that its holding prevents only a nding of false labeling on the basis of
doctrinal religious literature and having left open the question of whether the
or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying
such article.
26Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d at 1154,
1148.
27Id. at 1154.
28Id. at 1148.
29322 U.S. 78 (1944).
30Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d at 1156.
31Id. at 1156-57.
32Id. at 1160.
33Id. at 1161.
34Id. at 1148-49.
7E-meter lacked adequate directions for use,35 the FDA was sure to take another
shot. Even more damning was the court's per curiam clarifying observations in
response to the government's petition for rehearing, which stated that in order
to raise a religious defense to a charge of false statement (here misbranding),
the person charged with the alleged misrepresentation must have explicitly held
himself out as making religious, as opposed to medical, scientic, or otherwise
secular claims.36
In United States of America v. An Article or Device... Hubbard Elec-
trometer,37 the FDA once again sought nationwide condemnation of the E-meter
on the theory that it was misbranded and lacking adequate directions for use.38
This time, it was more successful. Judge Gesell entered a decree of condem-
nation essentially eliminating all secular use of the E-meter,39 but due to First
Amendment concerns felt forced to permit the Church and others who base
their use upon religious belief... to continue auditing practices upon specied
conditions which allow the Food and Drug Administration as little discretion as
possible to interfere in future activities of the religion.40 The court would have
required the following warning on every E-meter and every piece of literature
mentioning the device:
The E-meter is a device which has been condemned by
Order of a Federal Court for misrepresentation and misbranding, in violation
35Id. at 1162.
36Id. at 1164.
37333 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 1971) [hereinafter Hubbard
Electrometer].
38Hubbard Electrometer,333 F. Supp. at 358-59.
39Remember that although Dianeticists and Scientolo-
gists used the E-meter, only the latter is a religious or-
ganization. Hubbard introduced Dianetics in a 1950 ar-
ticle published in a magazine entitled ASTOUNDING
SCIENCE FICTION; furthermore, the article described
Dianetics as a new science. See Founding Church of Sci-
entology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1198 (Ct.Cl.
1969). He did not create the Founding Church of Sci-
entology (D.C.) until l955, but the Church has essen-
tially incorporated all of Hubbard's writings, including
those relating to Dianetics. The D.C. Church's Certi-
cate of Incorporation states that its purpose is [t]o act
as a parent church for the propagation of the religious
faith known as 'Scientology,' and to act as a Church for
the religious worship of that Faith. Id. at 1198.
40Hubbard Electrometer,333 F. Supp. at 364.
8of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Use of the E-meter is permitted
only as part of bona-de religious activity. The E-meter is not medically or
scientically useful for the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of disease. It is
not medically or scientically capable of improving the health or bodily functions
of anyone. Any person using, selling, or distributing the E-meter is forbidden
by law to represent, state or imply that the E-meter is useful in the diagnosis,
treatment, or prevention of any disease.41
Yet another appeal followed. The D.C. Circuit armed the district court's
decision but concluded that its Order would invoke the Government and the
courts in an excessive entanglement with religion and so limited the written
warning to the third and fourth sentences of the original Order, though it re-
tained the requirement that the E-meter could be sold or distributed only for
use in bona de religious counseling.42
In arriving at his decision, Gesell made use of the opening oered to
him by the court in its clarifying observations occasioned by the government's
petition for rehearing. Given the tenor of Wright's opinion, which, despite its
openings, emphasized that religious claims were as a matter of law immune
from judicial scrutiny and stated that the theory of auditing constituted such
a claim, you might think that Gesell would feel constrained in his examination
of Scientology literature. To the contrary. Citing the per curiam observation
regarding the requirement that the person charged must have explicitly held
himself out as making religious claims in order to mount a religious defense, the
court abruptly concluded that The bulk of the material is replete with false med-
ical and scientic claims devoid of any religious overlay or reference.... Viewed
as a whole, the thrust of the writings is secular, not religious. The writings are
labeling within the meaning of the Act. Thus the E-meter is misbranded and its
secular use must be condemned along with secular use of the oensive literature
as labeling.43
Gesell did, however, recognize that the First Amendment was impli-
cated in the case: Where there is belief in a scientic fraud there is nonetheless
an interference with the religion that entertains that belief if its writings are
censored or suppressed. Similarly, if a church uses a machine harmless in itself
to aid its ministers in communicating with adherents, the destruction of that
machine intrudes on religion.44 As such, he eliminated secular but not religious
use of the machine, setting conditions on the latter, as evidenced by his Order.
Having only partially succeeded in ending use of the E-meter through
its attempt to condemn the device nationwide, the FDA next attempted to ban
its import. And thanks to the elastic language of the FD&C Act's provisions
pertaining to import,45 it succeeded. In two cases, Church of Scientology of Cal-
411969-1974 FDLI Jud. Rec. 90 (D.D.C. 1971).
421969-1974 FDLI Jud. Rec. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
43Hubbard Electrometer,333 F. Supp. at 361-62.
44Id. at 363.
4521 U.S.C. 381(a)(3) permits the Secretary of Health
9ifornia v. Richardson46 and Church of Scientology of Minnesota v. Department
of Health, Education and Welfare,47 the FDA detained and refused admission
to E-meters imported from the United Kingdom into the United States on the
ground that the devices were misbranded for lack of adequate instructions as to
their use, and both courts accepted this theory. The devices in both cases bore a
disclamatory label stating that the E-meter was not intended or eective for the
diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of any disease.48 Both courts emphasized
these labels were not sucient to comply with the FD&C Act's requirements,
in that they did not provide directions for use. Both courts also reasoned that
they could consider the health claims made in Scientology literature without
having to assess their truth or falsity, an act forbidden by Ballard; having set
forth therapeutic uses of the E-meter in its literature, the courts found, the
E-meters were bound by the FD&C Act's directional provisions.49
The Church also attempted to defend on the ground that directions for
use were simply unnecessary (and hence the branding provisions inapplicable),
given that the E-meter was harmless in and of itself.50 In Church of Scientol-
ogy of California, the court went to some pains to argue that the device does
pose a danger in the possibility that ignorant and gullible persons are likely to
rely upon them instead of seeking professional advice for conditions they are
and Human Services (at the time of these cases, the Sec-
retary of Health, Education and Welfare) to refuse ad-
mittance to and then destroy any article that appears
to be misbranded, except as provided in subsection (b),
which provides so weak a check that it is no check at
all. Subsection (b) states that nal determination re-
garding an item's admission may be deferred if it ap-
pears to the Secretary that such item can be relabeled
to achieve compliance with the FD&C Act. In such a
situation, the Secretary may authorize such relabeling,
subject to departmental supervision.
46437 F.2d 214, 568 (9th Cir. 1971).
47341 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D. Minn. 1971), a'd on
the basis of District Court Judge Nordbye's opinion, 459
F.2d 1044 (8th Cir. 1972).
48Church of Scientology of California, 437 F.2d at 218;
Church of Scientology of Minnesota, 341 F. Supp. at
563-64.
49Church of Scientology of California, 437 F.2d at 218;
Church of Scientology of Minnesota, 341 F. Supp. at
658-59.
50Church of Scientology of California, 437 F.2d at 217.
10represented to relieve or prevent.51 In this way, it could deny the Church the
exemption that the misbranding provisions of the FD&C Act would otherwise
require.52 The court in Church of Scientology of Minnesota, which generally
relies heavily on its California counterpart, agreed.53
B. Sacramental drug use
Major conict between anti-drug laws and religious claims to sacra-
mental or otherwise religiously-oriented drug use dates back to the 1960s, when
federal legislation regulating many drugs, especially hallucinogenic drugs, was
passed for the rst time. The FDA has had authority to regulate such hal-
lucinogenic drugs under the authority of the FD&C Act,54 but the DEA now
administers and enforces federal anti-drug legislation.
Leary v. United States, a 1967 case in which Dr. Timothy Leary, a
well-known and respected scholar, challenged his convictions pertaining to mar-
ijuana on Free Exercise grounds,55 is perhaps the rst major federal case to
face this conict, but in the thirty years since the Leary decision, debate has
continued, perhaps most passionately regarding sacramental use of peyote.
1. Peyote
Peyote is a plant with psychedelic, hallucinogenic properties that has
been used for centuries in religious ceremonies and as an aid to attaining some
type of visionary or spiritual state. Until Congress passed the Drug Abuse
Control Amendments of 1965,56 the use of peyote, as well as numerous other
psychedelic substances, was perfectly legal on the federal level, though illegal in
51Id. at 217 (citing Drown v. United States, 198 F.2d
999, 1006 (9th Cir. 1952)).
5221 U.S.C. 352(f) provides that the Secretary of Health
and Human Services shall promulgate regulations ex-
empting such drug or device from such requirement if
adequate directions for use are not necessary for the pro-
tection of public health.
53Church of Scientology of Minnesota, 341 F. Supp. at
568.
5421 U.S.C. 301et seq.
55383 F.2d 851, 853 (5th Cir. 1967).
5679 Stat. 226 @3(a); these Amendments were subse-
quently superseded by the Controlled Substances Act, 21
U.S.C. 801-904, but the regulation of peyote was carried
forward, as well as the exemption granted to members of
the Native American Church for use of peyote in bona
de religious ceremonies.
11some states. When the federal legislation was passed, peyote was classied as a
Schedule I substance,57 which means that it was deemed to have a substantial
and detrimental eect on the health and general welfare of the American peo-
ple.58 Furthermore, all Schedule I substances have been found to have a high
potential for abuse, no currently accepted medical use, and a lack of accepted
safety for use, even under supervision.59 Only one exception to the peyote ban
exists. A DEA regulation, entitled Special Exempt Persons, specically exempts
peyote use by NAC members in the context of bona de religious ceremonies;
the exemption reads as follows:
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance under Sched-
ule I does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona de religious cere-
monies of the Native American Church, and members of the Native American
Church are exempt from registration.60
Promulgated in tandem with the 1965 Amendments, the exemption was car-
ried over into the Controlled Substances Act and still exists today.
As initially passed by the House of Representatives, the Drug Abuse
Control Amendments of 1965 specically exempted peyote used in connection
with the ceremonies of a bona de religious organization from control.61 The
Senate, however, deleted this provision, preferring an administrative determi-
nation of which drugs would be brought under the bill's control, subject to
prescribed standards.62 In response to concerns raised about the impact of the
Senate amendment on religious practices, Congressman Harris, Chairman of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Aairs, stated that:
Two decisions have been rendered in this area in
recent years.... Both these cases held that prosecution for the use of peyote in
connection with religious ceremonies was a violation of the rst amendment to
the Constitution.
In view of all this, I requested the views of the Food and Drug
Administration and have been assured that the bill, even without the peyote
exemption appearing in the House-passed bill, cannot forbid bona de religious
use of peyote.63
57Schedule I(c)(12), 21 U.S.C. 812(c).
5821 U.S.C. 801(2).
5921 U.S.C. 812(b)(1).
6021 C.F.R. 1307.31. About half of the states have sim-
ilar exemptions, whether created by statute or judicial
decision. See United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333,
1338 (D.N.M. 1991).
61H.R. 2, 11 Cong. Rec. 14608 (1965); see also NAC of
NY at 1249.
62S.Rep.No.89-337, quoted at 111 Cong. Rec. 14609
(1965).
63111 Cong. Rec. 15977 (1965).
12FDA's letter to Congressman Harris stated that
If the church is a bona de religious organization that
makes sacramental use of peyote, then it would be our view that H.R. 2, even
without the peyote exemption which appeared in the House-passed version,
could not forbid bona de religious use of peyote. We believe that the consti-
tutional guarantee of religious freedom fully safeguards the rights of the orga-
nization and its communicants.64
The bill, as amended by the Senate, promptly passed the House, and reg-
ulatory exemption for the NAC ensued; ve years later, Congress revised the
narcotics laws in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. During hearings on
the Act, Congressman Sattereld questioned Mr. Sonnenreich, an ocial of the
BNDD, about the status of the regulatory exemption for the NAC. Sonnenreich
replied, We consider the Native American Church to be sui generis. The history
and tradition of the church is such that there is no question but that they regard
peyote as a deity as it were, and we will continue the exemption.... Under the
existing law originally the Congress was going to write in a specic exemption
but it was then decided that it would be handled by regulation and we intend
to do it the same way under this law.65
Various Native American tribes have traditionally used peyote, and
the drug has played a central role in the religion known as Peyotism. To mem-
bers of the Native American Church, a peyotist religion, peyote is more than
a sacrament.... Peyote is, itself, considered a deity which cannot be owned by
any individual. Peyote is worshipped and eaten at a religious ceremony called
a peyote meeting.... It is considered sacrilegious to use peyote for nonreligious
purposes.66 At the time the federal legislation was passed, the Native American
Church was certainly the most well known, if not the only, recognized peyotist
religion, but since then, a number of religious groups have claimed that they,
too, regard peyote as a sacrament. As the war on drugs has become an in-
creasingly high priority in the federal government, conict between peyotists
claiming a right to use peyote under the Free Exercise Clause and government
agencies attempting to enforce the anti-drug laws has intensied.
Perhaps the most well-known early case discussing the conict between
religious claims to peyote use and legislation outlawing the plant is People v.
64111 Cong. Rec. 15977-78 (1965). At this time, the
FDA was charged with drug enforcement, a role now
delegated to the DEA.
65Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1970, hearings
before the Subcommittee on Public health and Welfare
of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 117-18
(1970).
66United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1335
(D.N.M. 1991).
13Woody, in which a Navajo Indian challenged his state conviction for unautho-
rized possession of peyote.67 The California Supreme Court reversed Woody's
conviction, applying the compelling interest test delineated in Sherbert. The
court held that use of peyote in bona de pursuit of religious faith outweighs
and does not frustrate any compelling state interest in a peyote ban.68
Following Woody and the passage of the Drug Abuse Control Amend-
ments of 1965, however, groups and individuals claiming a religious right to use
peyote have, in general, fared poorly. Members of the Native American Church
(NAC) are among the very few claimants to have successfully avoided conviction
under anti-peyote laws and to have petitioned the government for an exemption
from such laws. This is not surprisingly given that the NAC is the only church
that is expressly exempted from the operation of the federal anti-peyote law.
One recent case exhibits a particularly passionate defense of religious
freedom. In United States v. Boyll, a non-Native member of the NAC was
charged with importing peyote into the United States after making a religious
pilgrimage to Mexico to obtain the plant.69 The court found Boyll's profession
of belief in the tenets of the NAC to be bona de.70 The United States ar-
gued that Boyll could not be a member of the NAC{and thus could not call on
the exemption for protection{because neither he nor his spouse was 25% Na-
tive American, as required for membership by the NAC.71 Boyll presented both
scholarly and lay testimony to prove that non-Natives have in fact been admit-
ted to the Church and that only one branch of the NAC, the NAC of North
America, is known to restrict membership to Native Americans.72 Calling the
governments argument a racially restrictive reading of the federal exemption,
the court applied the compelling interest test and ruled for Boyll, nding that
no compelling interest even existed in this case given the very existence of an
exemption for members of the NAC.73 In fact, the court argued that the ex-
emption actually explicitly establishes a governmental interest in preserving the
exemption for peyote as a controlled substance for its ritual use by Indian and
non-Indian members of the Native American Church, especially given that the
exemption does not, on its face, restrict NAC membership to Natives (though
some state statutes have) nor did Congress ever distinguish between Native and
non-Native members.74 The court seemed to view the government's attempt
to impose a racial restriction to membership in a religious organization as an
excessive entanglement with religion.75
6761 Cal.2d 716, 717 (1964).
68Woody, 61 Cal.2d at 717.
69774 F. Supp. 1333, 1335 (D.N.M. 1991).
70Id. at 1337.
71Id. at 1335.
72Id. at 1336.
73Id. at 1335, 1341-42.
74Id. at 1342, 1338.
75Id. at 1340.
14A number of other religious groups have also petitioned agencies such
as DEA for extension of the NAC peyote exemption to cover their members,
but no such petition has been granted. Foremost among these groups is the
Peyote Way Church of God (Peyote Way), though groups that use other hal-
lucinogenic drugs have also tried to mount similar challenges. Peyote Way has
repeatedly petitioned the DEA for an exemption akin to the one aorded the
NAC. Peyote Way was founded by Immanuel Trujillo, previously a member of
the Native American Church.76 Members of Peyote Way, like those of the NAC,
regard peyote as a sacrament and a deity, and courts have generally accepted
their profession of belief as bona de.77
In Peyote Way Church of God v. Smith, after DEA denied its petition
for an exemption for sacramental peyote use, Peyote Way challenged both the
federal NAC peyote exemption and a parallel exemption granted by the State
of Texas.78 Rather than applying the compelling interest test, which would
seem to be mandated by Sherbert, the court argued that dierent treatment of
groups who profess a belief in the sacramental use of peyote was ne as long
as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulllment of Congress's
unique obligation toward the Indians.79 The court then found that the pref-
erence is reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government,
and granted summary judgment to the defendants.80
Peyote Way appealed the case to the Fifth Circuit. On appeal, the
court reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment, arguing that
the very existence of these exemptions negated the existence of a compelling
governmental interest, particularly given that the government failed to present
evidence of peyote's negative eects on religious users and failed to explain why
it couldn't monitor the peyote use of a 200-member group when it monitored the
250,000-member NAC without apparent diculty.81 The court then remanded
for additional evidence and ndings sucient to evaluate the plainti's Equal
76698 F. Supp. 1342, 1344 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
77See, e.g.,id.
78566 F. Supp. 632, 636, 635 (N.D. Tex. 1983) [here-
inafterPeyote Way I],rev'd,Peyote Way Church of God
v. Smith, 742 F. 2d 193 (5th Cir. 1984) [hereinafterPey-
ote Way II]; the exemptions dier materially only in that
Texas species that the exemption granted to members
of the Native American Church under this section does
not apply to a member with less than 25% Indian blood.
Sec.4.11(a), Art. 4476-15, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stat. The
federal exemption contains no such specication and
refers only to members of the Native American Church.
79Peyote Way I, 566 F. Supp. at 638.
80Id.
81Peyote Way II. 742 F.2d at 201. Given that the Fifth
15Protection claim.82
Back in the district court, the case became Peyote Way Church of God
v. Meese.83 Using the Sherbert compelling interest test, the court concluded
that plaintis' Free Exercise claim should yield to the governmental interest of
regulating the use of substances found to be harmful to the public at large.84
This time around, the court treated the federal exemption as a grandfather
clause, arguing that Congress specically exempted the NAC from the applica-
tion of the Controlled Substances Act because Native Americans used peyote
in the context of religious ceremonies before Congress rst determined that reg-
ulating psychotropic drugs was necessary to the general welfare.85 The court
also cited the American Indian Religious Freedom Restoration Act as support
for the special status accorded to Native Americans.86 In short, the court seems
to argue that Congress intended to exempt the NAC{and only the NAC; since
Peyote Way lacks this Congressional stamp of approval, the exemption was
properly denied.
Once again, Peyote Way appealed to the Fifth Circuit, but by the
time its case was decided, the Supreme Court's radical Smith decision had been
handed down and RFRA has not yet been passed, so the court could no longer
use the Sherbert compelling interest test to evaluate Free Exercise claims against
neutral laws of general applicability.87 This time around, the court explicitly
argued that the exemption for the NAC qualied as a political classication ap-
propriate to Native American cultural preservation.88 The court reasoned that
since Peyote Way was not similarly situated to the NAC in terms of Congres-
Circuit explicitly referenced compelling interest test, it
is probably safe to say that it found the district court's
invocation of rationality improper.
82Id. at 202.
83698 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D. Tex. 1988) [hereinafterPey-
ote Way III].
84Id. at 1346.
85Id.
86Id. at 1348.
87Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d
1210, 1213 (5th Cir. 1991) [hereinafterPeyote Way IV].
Note that the court would have had to apply the com-
pelling interest test, even given the Smith decision, if it
had found that the exemption constituted a racial clas-
sication; however, it ruled that the classication was
political rather than racial,id. at 1215, and so a rational
basis test could be applied.
88Id. at 1215.
16sional concern for cultural preservation, no denial of equal protection existed.89
The court also made short work of Peyote way's claim that the NAC peyote
exemption created an establishment of religion. Noting the Native Americans'
special status as sovereign nations, existing in a unique guardian-ward rela-
tionship with the United States, the court argued that the regulation properly
singled out one religion{the NAC{ because the NAC is the only tribal native
American organization of which the government is aware that uses peyote in
bona de religious ceremonies.90
Only two cases appear to be outliers, so to speak. In Kennedy v. Bu-
reau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Church of the Awakening petitioned
the Bureau to amend the regulation containing the NAC peyote exemption to
include the Church by expressly adding it to the exemption.91 The Church
challenged the regulatory exemption as creating an arbitrary classication in
violation of Fifth Amendment due process, and the government conceded that
the Church was bona de.92 Although the court conceded that Native Ameri-
cans historically have been classied dierently from non-Natives and assumed
(without deciding) that peyote use was more important to the former, it deemed
the classication arbitrary, an oense to substantive due process, because nei-
ther distinction set forth by the government was rationally related to the interest
that the regulation was designed to serve: the protection of human health.93
The court refused to nd for the petitioners, however, because it concluded that
their proposal{adding their own church name to the exemption{suered from
the same constitutional inrmity.94
The other oddball is Native American Church of New York v. United
States, in which the court ruled that the peyote exemption was equally avail-
able to the plainti, the Native American Church of New York, if in fact it is a
bona de religious organization and would make use of peyote for sacramental
purposes and regard the drug as a deity.95 The Church's name implies that it is
associated with the NAC, but this is not in fact the case. The NAC of New York
was founded by Alan Birnbaum in 1976, few of its members are Native Ameri-
cans, and the church is not aliated with the NAC in any way.96 The Church
claimed that it views not just peyote but all psychedelic drugs as deities, and
accordingly it petitioned the DEA to exempt all use of psychedelics provided
89Id. at 1214.
90Id. at 1217; the court did acknowledge that a challenge
by another Native American peyotist organization could
conceivably succeed. Id. at 1216.
91459 F.2d 415, 415 (9th Cir. 1972).
92Id. at 416.
93Id. at 416-17.
94Id. at 417.
95468 F. Supp. 1247, 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),a'd without
opinion, 633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980).
96Id. at 1248.
17that they are central to the existence of the Church and used in bona de reli-
gious ceremonies.97 The DEA promptly denied the petition, and the court did
rule for the DEA on all substances except for peyote, given the Congressional
determination of the dangerous, uncontrollable, and medically useless character
of Schedule I substances.98
However, presumably because of the exemption for NAC members from
the peyote provisions, the court examined the NAC of New York's attempt to
obtain a peyote exemption much more closely. The court cited a fair amount
of legislative history, including the statements by Congressman Harris and Mr.
Sattereld mentioned previously.99 The court reasoned, as follows, that the
peyote exemption did not per se exclude groups other than the NAC:
Plainly the Church [NAC] was sui generis because it was
the only religious organization then in existence that regarded peyote as a deity.
Mr. Sonnenreich's statement did not foreclose the exemption to other religious
organizations later established that also regard peyote as a deity, as the plainti,
the Native American Church of New York, claims to do.100
Hence, the court concluded that the plainti need only prove that it was
bona de and that it regarded peyote in the same light as the NAC to qualify
for the exemption.
2. Marijuana and LSD
A number of groups and individuals have sought to obtain an exemp-
tion for their use of marijuana and/or LSD. Like the peyotists, many of these
groups have attacked unsuccessfully the NAC peyote exemption. The Ethiopian
Zion Coptic Church is perhaps the litigious of these groups, but I will rst dis-
cuss Timothy Leary and the Neo-American Church, since they were among the
rst to raise the issue of the NAC peyote exemption.
In Leary v. United States, Dr. Timothy Leary, as well-respected
scholar who had turned his academic focus to the exploration of religious experi-
ence stemming from the use of psychedelics,101 was convicted of various federal
counts involving marijuana; Leary defended on the ground that he used the
drug as a sacramental aid to his practice of Hinduism.102 Despite the fact that
the court found that Leary's use of marijuana was not essential to his religion103
and deemed his religious defense insucient and immaterial to the validity of
his convictions,104 it nevertheless engaged in a discussion of his religious claims,
concluding that the protection of society constituted a paramount government
97Id..
98Id. at 1248-49.
99Id. at 1249-51.
100Id. at 1251.
101383 F.2d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 1967).
102Id. at 853.
103Id. at 860.
104Id. at 863.
18interest that precluded recognition of Leary's asserted religious right to use mar-
ijuana.105
In United States v. Kuch, Judith Kuch, an ordained minister of the
Neo-American Church, raised a Free Exercise claim as a defense to her indict-
ment on marijuana and LSD charges stemming from both the Marihuana Tax
Act of 1937 and the FD&C Act.106 The court rejected the claim, holding that
the Neo-American Church was not a religion. The court wrote that While there
may be and probably are some members of the Neo-American Church who have
had mystical and even religious experiences from the use of psychedelic drugs,
there is little evidence in this record to support the view that the Church and
its members as a body are motivated by or associated because of any common
religious concern.... It is clear that the desire to use drugs for their own sake,
regardless of religious experience, is the coagulant of this organization and the
reason for its existence.107 The court then went on to hold that, even if the
Church was a religion, it would still lose. Invoking a rational basis test,108
the court nevertheless analyzed the problem in a manner that recalls the com-
pelling interest test, which would have been the proper mode of analysis under
Sherbert. The court found that the public interest was paramount, citing a
concern for the breakdown of society109{the court associated marijuana with
health hazards, addiction, and crime, and it associated LSD with even greater
health hazards110{and for the further spread of drug usage, given the Church's
lax membership policy.111
The court also rejected Kuch's Equal Protection claim, which asserted,
as all such claims have, that the Church should be entitled to the same exemp-
tion as the NAC.112 The court rst addressed marijuana, which it noted was
covered by the Marihuana Tax Act rather than the FD&C Act, and pointed
out that only the latter makes any provision for religious exemption.113 Fur-
thermore, unlike for the NAC's use of peyote, Congress did not delegate to
FDA the opportunity to exempt a substance; rather, Congress itself determined
that marijuana was to be tightly controlled due to its health hazards.114 The
court then made short work of the claim for LSD, simply commenting that the
Church had never applied for an exemption from the FD&C Act for its use of
105Id. at 860.
106288 F. Supp. 439, 442 (D.D.C. 1968). The Mari-
huana Tax Act is found at 50 Stat. 551, as amended,
Int.Rev.Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. 4741-76.
107Kuch, 288 F. Supp. at 444.
108Id. at 452.
109Id. at 445.
110Id. at 445, 448.
111Id. at 447.
112Id.
113Id. at 450.
114Id. at 451.
19the drug.115
Members of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church claim that their use of
marijuana is sacramental, and that church doctrine obligates them to smoke it
continually all day, through church services, through everything we do.116 In
United States v. Middleton, Middleton, a member of the Church, was convicted
of importing and possession marijuana.117 The court promptly rejected his ar-
gument that the original Congressional classication of marijuana as a Schedule
I substance was unreasonable and held that reclassication upon new evidence
was a matter for legislative judgment.118 Using the compelling interest test,
the court held that the government interest in regulating and controlling the
distribution and use of marijuana outweighed claims of religious use, even in
prayer services.119
In a more recent case, Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration, Carl
Olsen, another member of the Church, unsuccessfully sought a religious exemp-
tion from the DEA for his use of marijuana.120 Despite several distinguishing
factors from Middleton{Olsen formulated a restrictive use proposal, and DEA
conceded that the Church was bona de, its use of marijuana sacramental{
the agency denied the exemption in a letter ruling.121 DEA argued that the
immensity of the marijuana abuse problem made for a compelling governmen-
tal interest in controlling marijuana tracking that outweighed the Church's
asserted religious interest.122 DEA also asserted that it had no authority to
promulgate an exemption for any other church than the NAC and implied that
the Director of the BNDD properly granted the NAC exemption only in reliance
on Congressional intent in the legislative history of the Controlled Substances
Act.123 The court rejected the DEA's assertion of lack of authority, holding
that Establishment Clause questions would arise if the DEA lacked power to
permit any other church to qualify.124
115Id. at 450.
116Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 878 F.2d
1458, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 906
(1990).
117690 F. 2d 820, 821 (11th Cir. 1982).
118Id. at 823.
119Id. at 824.
120Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1459.
121April 22, 1986 letter ruling from John Lawn, DEA Ad-
ministrator, to Carl Olsen [hereinafter Letter Ruling].
See id. The DEA's Final Order (July 26, 1988) [here-
inafter Final Order] is quoted in full in Olsen at 1465-
1468.
122Letter Ruling. See id. at 1459.
123Final Order. See id. at 1466.
124Id. at 1461.
20Nevertheless, the court ruled against Olsen on both his Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause challenges. Apparently invoking the compelling in-
terest test, the court ruled that accommodating the Church's religious use of
marijuana was not possible without unduly burdening or disrupting enforce-
ment of the federal marijuana laws. Given that the tenets of the Church en-
dorse marijuana use every day throughout the day, the court reasoned that
Olsen's proposal for conned use would not be self-enforcing. It is hardly un-
reasonable to forecast a large monitoring burden in light of the church's history,
which suggests that children would have easy access to marijuana and that few
checks would exist to prevent distribution to nonbelievers.125 The court then
rejected Olsen's Establishment Clause challenge, rejecting his contention that
the Church was similarly situated to the NAC for purposes of exemption.126 Ac-
cepting DEA's contention that [T]he actual abuse and availability of marijuana
in the United States is many times more pervasive... than that of peyote, the
court explicitly rested its decision on the immensity of the marijuana control
problem.127 Despite this ruling, however, the court discussed additional distin-
guishing factors. It noted that the NAC's peyote use is limited to a traditional,
precisely circumscribed ritual, whereas the Church teaches that marijuana is
rightly smoked all day.128 Furthermore, the court found that the peyote exemp-
tion is bound up with the federal policy of preserving Native American culture,
and thus can be comprehended properly only '[i]n light of the sui generis legal
status of American Indians.'129
III. JUDICIAL MOTIVATION
In this section, I will argue that court decisions with respect to gov-
ernment action against Scientology and sacramental drug use are motivated
primarily by one or more of the following factors: paternalism; hostility; and/or
the fear of embarking upon a slippery slope. Questions of trust recur in each of
these motives (or, alternatively, concerns). Paternalism typically involves one of
the following two questions for courts: 1) Do we, as decision makers in society,
trust the group or individual not to fool others?; and 2) Do we trust groups and
individuals not to harm themselves? Hostility often belies another question of
trust: Do we trust groups and individuals not to fool the government, which in-
cludes the courts? The question is not merely whether courts believe claimants
are bona de but whether courts believe they can accurately judge the sincerity
of these claimants. The third factor, the slippery slope, can be viewed from two
very distinct perspectives, one of which views the claimant's demands as the
source of a host of problems and the other of which views the government as
unduly restricting individual freedom and religious liberty. Both perspectives
125Id. at 1462.
126Id. at 1463.
127Id. at 1463, 1464.
128Id. at 1464.
129Id. at 1464.
21implicate questions of trust, but directed toward dierent actors. Those taking
the rst perspective ask whether the groups to whom we grant religious license,
so to speak, will keep that license limited. The more self-contained a group is,
the more isolated from the mainstream of society, the more it limits its mem-
bership and that membership's access to the item at issue, the more likely we
are to recognize and protect a religious interest. A special concern for cultural
preservation of some longstanding, but relatively small and culturally distinct
group, may also inuence a court's decision toward granting protection of the
religious interest. Furthermore, the fear that granting an exemption for one
religious group will open the oodgates for an untold number of me, toos may
also inuence a court's decision. Those taking the second perspective evince
a lack of trust in the government, fearing that it will override constitutional
mandates in an eort to combat social problems such as drug abuse.
A. Paternalism
A common concern manifested by courts who must decide how to re-
solve the conict between an asserted religious interest and a governmental law
or regulation is the same concern that they identify as a compelling or at least
important governmental objective: protection of the public. Furthermore, con-
cern for the public{specically, public health{underlies both the FD&C Act130
and the Controlled Substances Act, along with the Drug Abuse Control Amend-
ments of 1965 and 1970. Not surprisingly, courts who identify this concern are
predisposed to rule in favor of the government rather than the religious claimant.
They seem to be concerned with two questions. First, can we trust the claimant
not to fool others? Second, when must we prevent an individual from engaging
in a seemingly useless or even dangerous practice?
The Scientology opinions pertaining to importation of E-meters pro-
vide particularly strong examples of judicial paternalism. Both courts rejected
the argument made by the Church that it need not label its E-meters with
adequate directions for use because it fell within what one might term the
harmlessness exemption of the statute.131 Both courts, although implicitly ad-
mitting that the device was not itself directly harmful, vigorously argued that
the device cannot be considered truly harmless because of the possibility that
ignorant and gullible persons are likely to rely upon them instead of seeking
professional advice for conditions they are represented to relieve or prevent.132
Clearly, both courts feared that people might{misguidedly, they presumed{seek
130See, e.g., United States v. An Article or Device...
Hubbard Electrometer, 333 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D.D.C.
1971) (stating that The Food and Drug laws are designed
to protect the public.) [hereinafter Hubbard Electrome-
ter].
13121 U.S.C. 352(f).
132Church of Scientology of California v. Richardson, 437
22out diagnosis or treatment via E-meter rather than by going to a real doctor.
Taken together with both courts' rejection of disclamatory labels that quite
clearly disavowed any claim that the E-meter eectively could be used for the
diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of any disease{labels that any reasonable
person would understand{the courts' decisions manifest a desire to save people
from themselves, especially those few ignorant and gullible persons who do not
know better. Furthermore, the courts' ultimate ruling that the E-meters could
be banned from import due to a lack of adequate labeling only strengthens
the case for their paternalistic motives. By the time these cases were decided,
E-meters were manufactured in the United States as well as the United King-
dom,133 so it was not as if banning their importation would have prevented
further proliferation and use of E-meters in the United States. More likely, the
courts saw their decision as just one more way to manifest their disapproval of
a device they viewed as lacking any therapeutic value.
The very contention that a device, when used as a religious aid, can
and must bear adequate directions for use is in and of itself a questionable{even
bizarre{proposition. If the FDA permitted the device to be used for secular
purposes{which it does and need not do, according to United States v. An Ar-
ticle or Device{then, like every other FDA-regulated medical device, it makes
perfect sense to require labeling. After all, such devices have been adjudged
by FDA to have some scientic basis, and providing explanatory instructions
should not be dicult. But how does one explain how to use a device that
admittedly has no scientic basis? Gesell clearly barred the Church from mak-
ing any claims that the device has medical or scientic value in the diagnosis,
treatment, or prevention of disease. What, then, could the Church have written
on its label, whether directed at the subject or auditor? Hold one tin can in
each hand and answer the questions posed to you by the auditor? Have the
subject hold one tin can in each hand; pose a series of questions as per Scientol-
ogy publications and procedures. This seems downright silly, and it really does
not explain how to use the device except in the most formalistic of ways. It
certainly doesn't indicate how the device works{nor can it, given the religious
belief underpinning its use and utility. As such, any holding that the E-meters
at issue in these proceedings should be barred from import for a lack of adequate
instructions seems empty and unremediable.
Such a rationale also seems to conict with Gesell's order that the
Church and others who base their use upon religious belief will be allowed to
continue auditing practices upon specied conditions which allow the Food and
Drug Administration as little discretion as possible to interfere in future activ-
F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 1971) (citing Drown v. United
States, 198 F.2d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 1952).
133Church of Scientology of Minnesota v. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, 341 F. Supp. 563, 564
(D. Minn. 1971).
23ities of the religion.134 Since the Food and Drug laws are designed to protect
the public, Gesell wrote, the recourse aorded to the FDA must be the narrow-
est possible remedy to achieve the legitimate non-religious end, which in this
case is only to protect the public against misrepresentation since the E-meter
is harmless in itself.135 The import decisions permit the very interference and
overbroad remedy that Gesell's order was designed to avoid, and they do so in
a sweeping manner by allowing a bar on import of devices intended solely for
religious use. The import provisions of the FD&C Act represent the ultimate
in administrative discretion since they permit the Secretary of HHS to deny
import merely if a device appears to be misbranded.136 Given the distinction
made between use of the E-meter for secular and religious purposes,137 the im-
port decisions not only resist{even ignore{the implicit command that the FDA
should not interfere with religious use of the E-meter, but these decisions also
impinge directly on the availability of a key, legally-permitted element of reli-
gious practice.
Any number of sacramental drug use decisions cite the preservation
of public health and the need to protect the public from becoming addicted to
drugs or from being victimized by other addicted to drugs as motivating fac-
tors in their decision-making. In Leary v. United States, the court identied a
paramount government interest in the protection of society.138 The court ra-
tionalized its denial of an exemption largely on the basis that young people in
particular might succumb to the siren-like lure of drug use. The court wrote,
The danger is too great, especially to the youth of the nation, at a time when
psychedelic experience, 'turn on,' is the 'in' thing.... We will not, therefore,
subscribe to the dangerous doctrine that the free exercise of religion accords
an unlimited freedom to violate the laws of the land relative to marihuana.139
United States v. Kuch contains a virtually identical statement characterizing
the public interest [as] paramount;140 citing various authorities to prove that
marijuana and LSD were both serious health hazards, the court also noted that
marijuana was associated with addiction and crime.141
Court decisions pertaining to the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church ex-
134Hubbard Electrometer,333 F. Supp. at 364.
135Id. at 361, 363.
13621 U.S.C. 381(a)(3).
137Secular use was banned, but religious use was merely
restricted in a way geared to ensure that the public would
not be fooled into believing the E-meter had some med-
ical or scientic value.
138383 F.2d 851, 860 (5th Cir. 1967).
139Id. at 861.
140United States v. Kuch, 28 F. Supp. 439, 445 (D.D.C.
1968).
141Id. at 445-48.
24press similar concern. In United States v. Middleton, for instance, the court
emphasized the fact that Congress has strongly and clearly expressed its intent
to protect the public from the obvious danger of drugs and drug trac.142 Even
the court in Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which was
not particularly disposed toward the government's position, found the govern-
ment interest to be protection of health.143 The court, however, argued that
this interest was not actually related to the existence of an exemption permit-
ting only the NAC to sacramentally use peyote.144 Most courts approach the
question of whether a single exemption for the NAC is constitutional dierently
than the Kennedy court, however, implicitly arguing that the NAC's sui generis
legal status obviates the need to consider whether the government's interest in
protecting the public is relevant to that exemption. Hence as long as courts
find that the government's interest in public health and welfare is related to the
statute at issue and that granting an exemption would substantially undermine
that statute, they will typically deny the exemption.
Courts may also manifest paternalism in reference to those who are
already members of a particular group. In essence, courts in these cases are ask-
ing whether we trust groups and individuals not to harm themselves. Witness
the government's argument in People v. Woody, one of the early cases of this
nature. The Attorney General of California contended that since peyote could
be regarded as a symbol, one that obstructs enlightenment and shackles the
Indian to primitive conditions, the state had the responsibility to eliminate its
use.145 Today, in this era of political correctness, no government would be likely
to make such an argument{at least explicitly{but its assertion thirty years ago
reminds us that such concerns do surface. And what more paternalistic, even
condescending reasoning could there be? To its credit, the court in Woody re-
jected the government's argument outright, but it is not so hard to imagine its
implicit acceptance in a context less prominent than that of Native American
religion, especially given the prevalence of paternalism toward society generally.
Few court decisions today, in a time when autonomy is applauded, overtly evince
such paternalistic concerns, but they may be more hidden than nonexistent.
Not all courts, of course, are paternalistic. Some are decidedly anti-
paternalistic, even inclined to glorify individual freedom, and courts taking this
view are among the few to decide consistently in favor of the religious claimant,
providing, of course, that the court believes the claimant to be bona de. Woody
is one such example. In rejecting the Attorney's General's paternalistic argu-
ment, the court atly stated that We know of no doctrine that the state, in its
asserted omniscience, should undertake to deny to defendants the observance
142United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820, 824 (11th
Cir. 1982).
143Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, 459 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1972).
144Id. at 417.
145People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 723 (1964).
25of their religion in order to free them from the suppositious 'shackles' of their
'unenlightened' and 'primitive condition.146 United States v. Boyll, which will
be discussed at length in the section on The slippery slope, provides another
example. The tenor of the opinion is illustrated by the opening lines of Judge
Burciaga's opinion: There is a genius to our Constitution. Its genius is that it
speaks to the freedoms of the individual.... The Government's 'war on drugs'
has become a wildre that threatens to consume those fundamental rights of
the individual deliberately enshrined in our Constitution.147 While concern for
the fundamental rights of the individual meshes easily with an anti-paternalistic
stance, it seems to be more strongly related to the slippery slope concern that
the government has been diluting constitutional protections over the course of
the last several years, undermining not only individual freedom but also the
very foundation of our democratic society.
While paternalism commonly appears in judicial decision and certainly
inuences the outcome of cases, it does not usually appear to be a decisive fac-
tor. With the exception of the Scientology import decisions, every other opinion
discussed in this section{paternalistic and antipaternalistic{also contemplates a
slippery slope; the manner in which the court conceives of the slippery concep-
tion appears to serve as the linchpin of its decision-making.
B. Hostility
A court's hostility to a religious claimant{or, conversely, its embrace
of that claimant{also plays a key role in its decision-making. The main element
determining how a court views the claimant seems to be whether it trusts the
claimant not to fool the government, especially the courts. This question really
has two components. First, and most important, is whether the court believes
that the claimant is sincere and presents a bona de religious claim. Second is
a court's condence in its own ability to make this determination.
Courts have been especially harsh with and hostile toward Scientology,
more so than toward most of the sacramental drug use cases discussed in this
paper. Few of them have been willing to accord Scientology all-around religious
status.148 Both Gesell and Wright, in United States v. An Article or Device and
Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, respectively, formally refused
to decide that Scientology was a bona de religion. Rather, both held that the
146Id.
147United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1334
(D.N.M. 1991).
148In fact, courts have consistently denied the Church
exemption from the federal income tax,Founding Church
of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1199 (Ct.
Cl. 1969), and have denied its members deductions for
payments made to the Church for auditing or training
services and claimed as charitable contributions.
26Church had made out a prima facie case for religious status that the govern-
ment had failed to rebut.149 Both then explicitly noted that the government
might have made such an eort, thereby implying that had the government
chosen this course, it might well have succeeded. Wright's opinion, arguably
the most neutral of the Scientology opinions discussed in this paper, specically
stated that We do not hold that the Founding Church is for all legal purposes
a religion. Any prima facie case made out for religious status is subject to con-
tradiction.150 The court's per curiam opinion on rehearing went even further:
The Government up to this time, including its motion for rehearing, has not
challenged the bona des of appellants claim of religion. In the even of a new
trial, as indicated in the panel opinion, it would be open to the Government
to make this challenge.151 The court in Church of Scientology of California v.
Richardson even declined to consider the Church's alleged religious use of the
E-meter, deeming it irrelevant.152 Had the court believed that the Church was
bona de, it seems likely that the court would have given more consideration to
the impact of the FDA's detention of E-meters slated for import.
Gesell's opinion is a particularly interesting one in that hostility to-
ward Scientology pervades his opinion, and yet he ultimately felt constrained
to permit continued use of the device in a religious context. Gesell's comment
regarding the government's request that all E-meters be forfeited and destroyed
is telling: However desirable this may be in the public interest, the Court is
without power to so order in view of... the First Amendment.153 Furthermore,
he regarded this entire litigation negatively: Unfortunately the Government did
not move to stop the practice of Scientology and a related 'science' known as
Dianetics when those activities rst appeared.... Had it done so, this tedious
litigation would not have been necessary.154 Much of what drives this hostil-
149Hubbard Electrometer,333 F. Supp. at 360; Founding
Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146,
1162 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
150Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d at 1162.
151Id. at 1165. The government did not, in fact, rise
to this challenge upon retrial, a fact which Gesell ap-
pears to lament in commenting that no evidence to the
contrary was oered by the Government on the second
trial. Accordingly, for purposes of this particular case
only, claimant must be deemed to have met its bur-
den of establishing First Amendment standing (emphasis
mine). Hubbard Electrometer,333 F. Supp. at 360.
152Church of Scientology of California v. Richardson, 437
F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 1971).
153Hubbard Electrometer,333 F. Supp. at 365.
154Id. at 359.
27ity appears to be disbelief that Scientology is a bona de religion, and Gesell's
comments often become atly disparaging. Gesell calls Hubbard a facile, prolic
author whose quackery ourished.155 He refers to Scientology literature as skill-
ful propaganda designed to make Scientology and E-meter auditing attractive
in many varied, often inconsistent wrappings.156 You get the sense that Gesell
feels impelled to swallow a bitter pill in permitting continued religious use of
the E-meter: he will do it, but he will not be happy about it.
There is probably some basis for the intuition of many courts that Sci-
entology is not a bona de religion{or at least that it was not at its inception,
even if it now has genuine adherents. Hubbard did not set up Scientology as
a religious organization until ve years after he rst published his rst article
pertaining to Dianetics, and he represented Dianetics as a science.157 The very
title of his rst major work in the area was Dianetics: The Science of Mental
Health.158 Only after espousing Dianetics as a science did he begin to incor-
porate its theories, including the theory of auditing, into a religious structure.
In one of its own publications, the Church states that Scientology is going all
out as a religion. The religious aspect is highly functional, very true and is
very{much{more successful.... The public expects to have ministers around....
If you don't like religion for heaven's sake call yourself a Dianeticist.159 Does
any religion actually state that it is going all out as a religion? If it is a religion,
what else could it go all out as?, a judge might legitimately ask. The comments
about the movement's success as a religion and public expectations also seem
at odds with our concept of what constitutes a religion. Some of Scientology's
early adherents even seem to have regarded the move toward formal religious
organization as an attempt to provide a legal cloak for the movement's activ-
ities.160 Furthermore, Scientology is money-oriented. Church doctrine holds
that you must always give something back for what you receive. This doctrine
is not in and of itself unusual, but the Church's pay-for-services application of
the doctrine is{and this aspect probably spurs more skepticism about whether
the Church is bona de than anything else. Many judges have commented on
the cost aspect of Scientology. Wright, for instance, documented a cost of $500
for 25 hours of auditing and noted that E-meters cost $125 apiece161; Gesell
added that the state of clear was guaranteed for $5000.162 How often does a
church guarantee spiritual or any other type of well-being for a monetary price?
155Id.
156Id.
157See supra notes 24, 39.
158See supra note 23.
159Church of Scientology statement in issue 14 of its pe-
riodical ABILITY, quoted in Hubbard Electrometer, 333
F. Supp. at 362.
160Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d at 1152.
161Id. at 1152, 1153.
162Hubbard Electrometer,333 F. Supp. at 362.
28Nevertheless, a large number of Scientology temples now exists, and
the movement has spread worldwide. Even if the movement was originally con-
verted into a religion to attain more favorable tax status, in an eort to take
advantage of the heightened protection aorded religion in the United States,
or even because Hubbard could make more money under the guise of religion
than science, certainly now the movement must have genuine adherents. It is
hard to imagine that John Travolta or Tom Cruise, for instance, are in it for
the money. Dishonest leaders do not a religion make, but it's hard to say that
where a sincere following exists, dishonest leaders render a movement nonreli-
gious. Most of the televangelists' congregations would be aorded no protection
were this the case!
Interestingly, Judge Gesell also wrote the opinion in United States v.
Kuch. Here, too, his hostility seemed to stem from his belief that the Neo-
American Church, incorporated as a nonprot organization in 1965, was not
bona de.163 Gesell referred to the Church as an alleged religion and charac-
terized its membership as mocking established institutions, playing with words,
and totally irreverent.164 He cited as examples of this irreverence and insincer-
ity the Church's ocials songs (Pu, the Magic Dragon and Row, Row, Row
Your Boat) and its symbol (a three-eyed toad), and he wrote that its 'Cate-
chism and Handbook' is full of goofy nonsense, contradictions, and irreverent
expressions.165 Having painted this absurd picture of the Church, Gesell had
no diculty concluding that it was not a bona de religion;166 although he rec-
ognized that the Church had made a conscious eort to assert in passing the
attributes of a religion, he concluded that this eort was made obviously only
for tactical purposes.167
Proving that a religion is bona de is no easy task. Groups like the
Peyote Way Church of God and Scientology, for instance, both of which can
probably make the strongest arguments for recognition of their bona de re-
ligious belief, at least at this point in time, cannot point to an entrenched
historical tradition in this country, unlike the Amish or the NAC. Not surpris-
ingly, courts seem inclined to question those things with which they lack famil-
iarity. Although making out a prima facie case does not present substantial
obstacles{in Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, Wright identied
the existence of ministers licensed as such, with legal authority to marry and
bury, as well as fundamental writings containing a general account of man and
his nature comparable to those of recognized religions as sucient to establish
the prima facie case168{if the government challenges a group's claim to be a
163United States v. Kuch, 28 F. Supp. 439, 443 (D.D.C.
1968).
164Id. at 444.
165Id.
166Id.
167Id. at 445.
168Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d at 1160.
29religion, meeting that burden of proof may not be easy. Nascent groups do
not have the historical advantage of the Amish, the Mormons, or the Jehovah's
Witnesses, for instance, all of whom enjoy an unquestioned acceptance of the
sincerity of their religious beliefs, even when courts nd those beliefs bizarre
or even unacceptable. Given that many of the groups discussed in this paper
sprung up around the 1960s{a time in which societal concern regarding the use
of psychedelic drugs grew rapidly{or later, and that some of them{such as the
Neo-American Church{truly were fronts for drug use, any claimant making a
non-established religious claim will face skepticism.
The second issue of trust that may arise for courts is whether they
believe they can judge a claimant's sincerity accurately. When a court doubts
its ability to determine sincerity one way or another, it seems inclined to rule
against the religious claimant. It appears that courts taking this position will
often assume, without deciding, that a claimant is bona de and then go on to
deny his or her claim under either a compelling interest test or some version of
a rational basis test. When a court is convinced that it has accurately assessed
a claimant's asserted religious motivation as a sham, it easily rules against that
claimant, as in Kuch, supra; in such a case, the court need never engage in
weighing the conicting claims, for it can simply rule that the claimant is not
bona de in his or her asserted religious motivation, mooting the First Amend-
ment question in that particular case.
When, however, a court truly believes a claimant to be sincere, this
factor does not appear to be dispositive. Rather, another factor comes strongly
into play: does the judge fear a slippery slope problem or, perhaps more ac-
curately, how does the judge conceive of the slippery slope? Usually the judge
envisions some detriment to or even disintegration of society{but the real ques-
tion becomes who the judge considers responsible. In other words, does the
judge blame the religious claimant for contributing to or causing the problem{
or does he or she view the government as threatening, even gutting, religious
liberty? I will discuss this issue at greater length after providing some discussion
of the slippery slope fear as a key motivating factor in judicial decision-making.
C. The slippery slope
The question of whether a slippery slope exists often determines whether
or not a court will grant the requested religious exemption. Courts may regard
the existence of a slippery slope from two very dierent points of view, how-
ever. Courts taking the rst point of view tend to believe that the problem in
some way stems from the demands of religious claimants. For those taking this
point of view, I contend that courts are most likely to recognize and protect
an asserted religious interest when the group 1) is self-contained and relatively
isolated from the mainstream of society; and 2) limits its membership and ac-
cess to the item at issue. I will also argue that unless a group can lay claim
to a longstanding religious tradition{in eect, make what amounts to a claim
for cultural preservation{courts are likely to deny the requested exemption. In
contrast to courts who view the demands of religious claimants as problematic,
30some courts take a second, opposing point of view. These courts view the gov-
ernment as the entity that poses a threat{a threat to individual autonomy and
the exercise of constitutional rights.
Most of the courts taking the rst point of view ask whether the
claimants who seek religious license, so to speak, will keep that license lim-
ited. To put this another way, courts granting a religious exemption want to
be reasonably sure that the group's practice will not spread and infect the rest
of society. Will the group control members' access to drugs, for instance, and
ensure that they are used only in bona de religious ceremonies? Will the group
enforce particular criteria for membership and ensure that its members are sin-
cere, or will the insincere be able to gain access simply by professing belief?
Some courts also worry{or worry even more{that granting one claimant a reli-
gious exemption will open the oodgates to a thousand such applications. These
courts fear that the capacity of both administrative agencies and the courts will
be strained unduly. In short, however they approach the slippery slope question
from this rst point of view, courts commonly worry that granting one group
a religious exemption will mean loosing a host of trouble upon society; hence
they usually deny the requested exemption.
However, one special concern{a concern for cultural preservation{may
come into play, and where the court deems this concern merited it will likely
grant the requested religious exemption. The chances that a court will grant
an exemption increase as the probability and severity of harm to the culture in-
creases and as the danger that the government will be fooled decreases. Groups
who can make this cultural claim typically exhibit the same characteristics as
those used by courts to assess the threat that a group's practices will spread.
Relevant criteria include the following: 1) the group is a longstanding, but rel-
atively small and culturally distinct group; 2) it is widely recognized as bona
de; 3) little chance exists that just anyone will join it (either because of the
religion's strictures or because membership is limited); and 4) the claim pressed
involves a practice central to the religion.
Perhaps the classic example of such reasoning, including emphasis on
all four factors mentioned above, is Wisconsin v. Yoder, a case in which the
Burger court held, under the rubric of Free Exercise, that Amish parents were
not required to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade.169 A sur-
prisingly large portion of the court's opinion is devoted to praising the Amish
culture and to elaborating its long history in the United States, and the group
exhibits each of the four characteristics mentioned above. In an eort to distin-
guish the Amish from others who might claim a similar exemption, the court
wrote that It cannot be overemphasized that we are not dealing with a way
of life or a mode of education by a group claiming to have recently discovered
some 'progressive' or more enlightened process for rearing children for modern
life.170 In accepting the Amish's Free Exercise claim, the court also rejected an
Establishment Clause challenge:
169406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
170Id. at 235.
31The purpose and eect of such an exemption are not to
support, favor, advance, or assist the Amish, but to allow their centuries-old
religious society, here long before the advent of any compulsory education,
to survive free from the heavy impediment compliance with the Wisconsin
compulsory-education law would impose.... Aided by a history of three cen-
turies as an identiable religious sect and a long history as a successful and
self-sucient segment of American society, the Amish in this case have convinc-
ingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship
of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play
in the continued survival of Old Order Amish communities and their religious
organization, and the hazards presented by the state's enforcement of a statute
generally valid as to others.171
Had the Amish been a new group, virtually unknown and its membership
open to anyone who cared to join, or had they pressed a claim that the court
found to be peripheral to their religious beliefs, it is not hard to imagine that
court would have denied their request for an exemption.
A similar concern for cultural preservation underlies the exemption
accorded to the NAC. Courts have emphasized that the NAC has a longstanding
tradition of ceremonial peyote use, one in existence long before the government
instituted anti-peyote laws. Courts also often speak of the special relationship
that the government has to Native Americans, a relationship described by one
court as guardian-to-ward172 and that implicitly extends to the NAC. The court
in Peyote Way Church of God v. Smith explained this special relationship as
follows:
The Congress has a power or duty to the Indians to pre-
serve their dependent nations until such a time as they may become so assim-
ilated so as to not be 'a people apart.' The exercise of power or duty if not
over or to Indians as legalistic 'tribes' but as people who have a distinctive cul-
ture. Congress in the American Indian Religious Freedom restoration Act has
recognized this duty owed. The Federal Government and the State of Texas
are furthering this policy by granting an exemption for the use of peyote in the
rituals of the Native American Church.173
As the court in Olsen v. DEA argued, the peyote exemption is bound up
with the federal policy of preserving Native American culture, and can be com-
171Id.
172See Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922
F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991) [hereinafterPeyote Way
IV].
173Peyote Way Church of God v. Smith, 566 F. Supp.632,
639 (N.D. Tex. 1983) [hereinafter Peyote Way I], rev'd
on other grounds, Peyote Way Church of God v. Smith,
742 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Peyote Way
Church of God II].
32prehended properly only '[i]n light of the sui generis legal status of American
Indians.174 Interestingly, all of these comments also have clear overtones of
paternalism{a special need to protect or preserve dependent peoples, whom we
view as wards.
A signicant amount of debate has been engendered by the question of
how to interpret comments made during Congressional hearings on the NAC ex-
emption regarding the Church's sui generis legal status.175 Some courts seem
to think that this characterization implies that Congress viewed the NAC as
unique and only intended the exemption to apply to that Church. Others con-
cede that Congress viewed the NAC as unique at the time the exemption was
promulgated{either because the NAC was the only group with a bona de claim
to religious use of peyote or because Congress was unaware of any other qual-
ifying groups{but argue that it did not mean to forever close the door to any
other group.176 Still others seem to think that Congress never intended the
exemption to be limited to the NAC, a viewpoint which nds some support
in the legislative history. For instance, before deletion by the Senate, H.R. 2
originally contained a general clause permitting peyote use in connection with
the ceremonies of a bona de religious organization.177 Furthermore, the FDA
letter to Congressman Harris did not limit its comments to the NAC's use of
peyote either.178 Arguably, the FDA's letter even manifests a belief that the
government could not constitutionally interfere with a claimant's bona de cer-
emonial religious use of peyote, regardless of any Congressional specication on
the matter. However hard this debate may be to resolve, it demonstrates that
both Congress and administrative agencies unquestionably regarded the NAC
as exempt and in fact accorded it special protection by singling it out in the
regulation.
Furthermore, courts have invariably mentioned the same factors on
174878 F.2d 1458, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
175See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
176See, e.g.,Peyote Way IV, 922 F.2d at 1217, in which
the court argues that the exemption facially singles out
the NAC because the NAC is the only tribal Native
American organization of which the government is aware
that uses peyote in bona de religious ceremonies. Al-
though the court believed that a challenge by another
Native American peyotist organization could succeed, it
was not willing to open the door any further, arguing
that it is the government's unique guardian-ward rela-
tionship with the Native Americans, dependent sovereign
tribes, that renders an exemption for them constitu-
tional. Id. at 1216-17.
177See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
178See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
33which the Burger court placed emphasis in deciding to grant the Amish a re-
ligious exemption from Wisconsin's compulsory-education laws. Several cases
have also noted that the NAC's membership is restricted to those who have 25%
Native American blood and their spouses, though this assertion was vigorously
challenged by Judge Burciaga in United States v. Boyll.179 Whether or not the
25% rule is commonplace, the point remains that courts believe membership to
the NAC is limited, either by the 25% rule or by the improbability that people
will join the Church just to gain access to peyote; the Church only has about
250,000 members.180 Peyote use, after all, is tightly controlled by the Church
and is permitted only during the meeting, the Church's ceremonial ritual. Fur-
thermore, no one questions the Church's assertion that peyote use is central to
the practice of its religion. The Church's long history in this country also sets
it apart from movements like the Peyote Way Church of God that have sprung
up much more recently{and hence have a much harder time establishing that
they are bona de. Furthermore, as the court's comments, supra about a people
apart indicate, courts view the NAC as a culturally distinct group.
Contrast this treatment of the NAC with other self-proclaimed sacra-
mental drug users, who have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the same type
of exemption accorded to the NAC. With the single exception of the NAC of
New York, each of these groups has failed, and courts have consistently dis-
tinguished them from the NAC on the basis of the one or more of the criteria
referred to above. Even Peyote Way, founded by a former member of the NAC,
has been unsuccessful in its attempts to obtain a religious exemption.
Groups who are not able to make the type of cultural claim available
to the NAC face an uphill battle. Courts often forecast a doom and gloom
scenario should a religious exemption be granted. The Leary court was one of
179See, e.g., Peyote Way IV, 922 F.2d at 1215 for the
25% gure. See Unites States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp.
1333, 1136 (D.N.M. 1991) for scholarly and lay testimony
that only the NAC of North America uses such a racial
restriction and that other branches have historically ac-
cepted non-Natives into the Church. Judge Burciaga's
conclusion in Boyll that the racial restriction on mem-
bership is not typical of the NAC seems to be based on
more thorough research than any other court has un-
dertaken in this area, with the possible exception of the
Thornburgh case citedsupra. And there may be an expla-
nation for this seeming discrepancy if courts who have
cited the 25% gure were relying on the admission re-
quirements of the NAC of North America, perhaps the
most well-known branch of the NAC.
180Peyote Way Church of God II, 742 F.2d at 201.
34the rst major cases to raise the fear that granting an exemption for religious
drug use would nullify our anti-drug statutes and pose an unacceptable level of
risk to society. As the court argued, It would be dicult to imagine the harm
which would result if the criminal statutes against marihuana were nullied as
to those who claim the right to possess and trac in this drug for religious pur-
poses. For all practical purposes the anti-marihuana laws would be meaningless,
and enforcement impossible.181 The court in United States v. Kuch even man-
aged to use the call for individual freedom as a rationale for denying a religious
exemption, reasoning that If individual religious conviction permits one to act
contrary to civic duty, public health and the criminal laws of the land, then
the right to be let alone in one's belief with all the spiritual peace it guarantees
would be destroyed in the resulting breakdown of society.182 The Kuch court
seemed to be concerned that granting an exemption would result in widespread
usage of marijuana, especially given the Church's policy of admitting anyone
who so desired as a member, no matter what you suspect his motives to be.183
Allowing Kuch's claim, the court reasoned, would permit anyone to violate the
law by paying the Church membership fee. The number of marihuana cases in
this court suggests that there are many who would quickly take out a member-
ship and then the [Marihuana Tax] Act would be a nullity.184
Both courts faced with deciding the question of whether to grant the
Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church an exemption, some 15-20 years after Kuch, man-
ifested similar concerns. In United States v. Middleton, the courts took an even
broader view of the slippery slope than did the Kuch court, observing that, Ex-
tended to its logical conclusion, appellant's argument would protect all drugs,
not just marijuana, if any religious group chose to use them as a religious sacra-
ment.185 The court in Olsen v. DEA further forecasted an unreasonably large
monitoring burden for the DEA should the exemption be granted. Given that
the Church's tenets endorse marijuana use every day throughout the day and
that its short history suggested a penchant for lax distribution of marijuana,
the court held that even though Olsen's proposal contemplated restricted use,
it would not be self-enforcing.... We are unaware of any 'free exercise' prece-
dent for compelling government accommodation of religious practices when that
accommodation requires burdensome and constant ocial supervision and man-
agement.186 Furthermore, the court took this burden for granted, not requiring
181Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 861 (5th Cir.
1967).
182United States v. Kuch, 28 F. Supp. 439, 445 (D.D.C.
1968).
183Id. at 443.
184Id. at 447.
185United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d. 820, 825 (11th
Cir. 1982).
186Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 878 F.2d
35the DEA to present actual evidence of the need for supervision, an apparent re-
versal of the normal allocation of burden of proof under the compelling interest
test.
Finally, the slippery slope factor also implicates the fear that grant-
ing an exemption for one religious group will open the oodgates for an untold
number of me, toos. Courts often fear that granting one exemption will lead
other groups to make a similar request, which will not only clog up government
agencies and the courts but will also require the courts to continually confront
dicult constitutional claims regarding equal protection, establishment of reli-
gion, substantive due process, and so forth. The court in Olsen v. DEA, for
instance, believed that granting one exemption would open the door to others;
the court reasoned that either the Equal Protection or the Establishment Clause
would appear to command that it [DEA consider requests for exemptions] even-
handedly.... The DEA would have no warrant to contain the exemption to a
single church or religion.187 And after agency consideration, of course, would
come further litigation. You might call this an apres moi, le deluge mentality.
As long as a court both trusts that a claimant is bona de and that it
is capable of making this determination, its decision will often turn on how it
interprets the slippery slope. Where the court views granting an exemption as
gutting our laws and opening the door to a veritable ood of claimants, as in
Leary v. United States188 and Olsen v. DEA,189 it will almost certainly refuse
the exemption. If, however, the court views the slippery slope danger from
the opposite perspective{i.e., as granting the government too much power over
individuals{as in United States v. Boyll,190 it will be more inclined to rule in
support of the religious claim.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Leary typies that of courts who express
a concern that granting a religious exemption will result in the nullication of
our anti-drug laws. The court seems to fear that once a single such exemption
is granted, anti-marijuana laws would be rendered meaningless.191 Most likely,
a good portion of this fear stems from the fact that Leary's use of marijuana
did not appear to be circumscribed by anything or anyone other than himself.
Although Leary asserted that he used marijuana in connection with his reli-
gion, Hinduism, the court was able to show that such use was not essential to
the practice of his religion.192 Not all Hindus use marijuana as a sacrament,
and Leary's use did not t within the connes of a tightly controlled ritual.
Rather, he used marijuana whenever and however he saw t. As such, the
1458, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 906
(1990).
187Id. at 1464.
188383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967).
189878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
190774 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991).
191Leary, 383 F.2d at 861.
192Id. at 860.
36court probably feared that granting him an exemption{even if he would use it
responsibly{would open the courts to a wave of similar individualized requests
from people who did not have the bona de interest and impressive academic
background193{and therefore respect{accorded to Leary.
In United States v. Boyll, Judge Burciaga passionately defended reli-
gious freedom, but not without having rst assured himself of Boyll's sincerity.
To Robert Boyll, the court wrote, peyote is both a sacrament and a deity es-
sential to his religion.194 Burciaga conducted a meticulous examination of the
sincerity of Boyll's beliefs. In so doing, he undertook signicant research into
peyotism and the NAC, accepting both scholarly and lay testimony and a-
davits tending to show that Boyll had been a member of the NAC since 1981
and that between 1981 and 1989, he participated in peyote ceremonies once ev-
ery 2-3 weeks.195 Furthermore, he had both sponsored the ceremonies and been
selected by other NAC members to serve as an ocial during various ceremonies,
and he had undertaken a pilgrimage to Mexico, where peyote is harvested; such
a journey is considered an act of piety in the NAC.196 Finally, the court's re-
search showed{contrary to the government's assertions{that only the NAC of
North America excluded people from membership based on racial criteria; no
other branch of the NAC appeared to do so.197
Convinced of Boyll's sincerity and of his own capability to make this
determination, Burciaga let loose with a judicial opinion that pounded not only
the government's position in this case, but the eect of its war on drugs on
religious and other constitutional freedoms. Having berated the government for
its arrogance, and having called its attack on religion menacing, Burciaga did
not hesitate to conclude that the present prosecution is, at best, an overreaction
driven by political passions or, at worst, inuenced by religious and racial insen-
sitivity, if not outright hostility.198 Like most courts, Burciaga feared a slippery
slope, but unlike most courts, the slippery slope he saw was one in which citi-
zens' individual, constitutional rights were being stripped away one by one. He
thus had little diculty in ruling for Boyll, even in{or perhaps because of{a
climate in which the Smith decision had recently been handed down.
IV. CONCLUSION
Judicial decision-making regarding the conict between religious claims
and the enforcement of laws such as the FD&C Act, the Controlled Substances
Act, and various other anti-drug regulations and enactments is primarily mo-
tivated by one or more of the following factors: paternalism; hostility; and/or
fear of embarking upon a slippery slope. For any court to decide in favor of
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37a religious claimant, of course, it must rst determine whether that claimant
is sincere and professes a belief that can accurately be called religious. Even
this determination, however, plays a signicant role in determining the judge's
level of hostility{or lack thereof{toward the claimant. Bona des aside, however,
courts also seem to be motivated by paternalistic concerns and, most especially,
by their conception of the slippery slope.
Paternalistic attitudes are manifested not only toward the general pub-
lic, but toward groups that courts conceive of as needing special protection: the
ignorant, the gullible, children, even Native Americans. Although important
as a factor, however, paternalism does not fully account for courts' decision-
making except perhaps for the Scientology import cases. Rather, courts rely
most heavily on their conception of the slippery slope in deciding whether to
grant a religious exemption. More often than not, the exemption is denied, but
this seems to accord with the ratio of 1) courts that view claimants as the source
of a variety of problems to 2) those that blame the government for overzealous
pursuit of other societal objectives, such as the war on drugs, at the expense of
religious freedom. Courts that view claimants' demands as unleashing undesir-
able consequences typically will not even grant a religious exemption when the
claimant is able to demonstrate that its group is self-contained, with limited
admission and limited access to the item in question. While these factors, like
sincerity, are necessary to granting an exemption, they do not generally appear
to be sucient. Rather, a group must also be able to lay claim to some histori-
cal tradition, which needs protection in order to survive. Cultural preservation
is therefore key, as evidenced by the experience of the NAC and the Amish,
in contrast to the experience of groups like the Peyote Way Church of God.
Intriguingly, taken together, these factors suggest that the group most likely to
succeed is the one most detached from society at large, making it unlikely that
its behavior will somehow rub o on the general public.
In stark contrast to courts that pinpoint claimants as the source of
future problems, those that view the government as the agent threatening soci-
etal mores are much more likely to grant a requested religious exemption. Such
courts are also unlikely to exhibit the type of paternalistic attitudes commonly
expressed by judges who cite the need to protect the health and welfare of the
ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous.
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